## Mastering the Arithmetic of Arms Control

The order in which weapons are dismantled will play a large role in easing—or maintaining—the tensions that hinder arms control. Cutting counterforce ICBMs first would facilitate further reductions.

By Albert Gore Jr.

President Reagan's speech at Eureke College Sunday instantly changed the nature of America's debate over strategit weapons and arms control Whether one agrees with his proposal or not the fact must be recognized that be has now called for a resumption of talks with the Sovieu and that he has laid down this country's official negonsting position. As a result, advocates of competing plans and approaches have a different role to play.

The proposal itself raises many questions It is a call for U.S and Soviet forces to look rather like mirror-image twins, a resemblance that would be achieved by carrying away at the many differences which presently distinguish

so: ade from the other

In the fur, phase the President wants sharp reductions M a point where both sides would have equal numbers of articade on an equal number of ballistic missiles (munting with the ground and sus-frunched varieties), with no more than half of those warfleads to be based on land

In the semnic place, the President wants each side to have equal throw weight at a figure lower than that for current L'S forces (Throw weight is a measure of bon big e payload of weapons missiles can loft from the United States to targets in the Soviet Union and vice versa.)

Armship to the Pres dent, these reductions would be made to achieve "stability through significant reductions in the nost destabiliting publics agreems believe missiles and especially intercornmental ballistic missiles. This statement is in line with a growing consensus among students of the nuclear weapons problem in this

conting that the arma-motive process in our let segreted on the a-malled TCEM value raising problem—a single of issues and fears that is forming both sides to deploy ever greater numbers of weep in in a search for salety. Beginning this is a problem that a ferma in rather than the Committee of the committee of

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Rep. Albert Gore Jr. (D. Tenn.) is a member of the house Select Committee on Intelligence and of the Committee on Science and Technology.

is that the Soviets could not their advantages in also and totally of NEM makes and warlands is in-source out ICFM also and out brakes been and that it would take only a front to of the Soviet Union's ICBM from to do so Pierr this to serve, the I wident would have a difficult child to serve, the I wident would have a difficult child to the Pierre of the Takestop and I. Si viet of the thin to Soviet who was beld in measure of all lines of prople-graphs who in ght be acceded the Frontiers deviced to the formation of the terms with the Soviets instead.


Many acceded and proplets U.S. also recleared in an example of the server o is the the Soviets well on their adventages in also and

direct the foor of one. The park of the this is that maintaintees there is that such a write is now at least restrict and itself profile for the Science.

Our planners have may relet to this profile to be concluding that the form and relet of form our terms at a liter Science of the bold in many after the formers at a liter Science of the bold in many after the formers at a liter to be of the bold in many after the formers at a liter to be of the bold in many after the formers at a liter to be of the bold in many after the formers and the formers are the formers and the formers and the formers are profitted to the formers are the ore timed, and the fight follows a firm suffice.

The cause of their great accuracy, these new was promised by partner counterforce was promises the formers of the quantity Several (CBMs); their allow And because of the quantity Several (CBMs); their allow And because of the quantity.

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ty of these weapons that we are to deploy, they would exist in numbers great enough to earry out, in theory, a U.S. first strike against Soviet forces So, as a side effect of our effort to close our window of vulnerability, we would be opening a window of vulnerability on the Soviets Moreover, the Soviet window would be proportionately more serious for them Our nuclear forces are relatively well as new emoor land, air and see based launchers, while the Seviets have monomorated almost 80 per cent of their Ducher werheads on land-based ballistic missiles

But it is clearly not in our interest to open a Soviet window of vulnerability if our objective in all this is to reduce the chances of nuclear war. Unless we and the Soviets change from the path down which we are beading, we will create a situation in which each side will have so word to lose if it besitates to an during a crisis that both sides will be forced to keep their nuclear forces on a hair-triggs: slert, ready to be launched at the first hint of an immisent smark from the other side. And it a political make fear may prompt a disastrous miscalculation. Once the maked, ICBMs exampt to recalled

As I said, the President's proposal legious with these

facts in mind, and purports to deal with them. However, the problem is that not all reductions are benign, and not all forms of equality lead to stability.

Stability is not a mathing inherent in the strategic forces of either country, taker by themselves it depends instead on the relationship to ween the two forces and on how these forces send to influence decision-making when

how these recrees there is no each other.

To assess the President's program, in other words it is essential in know precisely how the forces of each wide would look as they went through the two phases of his proposal. There are many paths that either side muld tel: and the President has understandably not spelled then out in his opening position. It is quite possible to realign the forces of both countries in a way that for his real go the force of foll courses to a way the no souther, but that lead not to more but to less and thing than before. Both adds mult be mirror images of each other, and both multi-crief in much smaller numbers. Yet, other, and note stude only in much amazer miniments are, each side might, depending on the weapons if chose it chose here still be us position to issued a first strike against the other's LTEMs while retaining substantial from it reserves to the afternasti, the attacker would enjoy a substantial numerical advantage over the virtim.

In other words, the President's formule can be worked out in a way that leads to the worst of all possible arrange ments mutually valuerable forces for both muntines, point a ways on a bein trigger elert. Rough calculations! have done based on evicting and necoming U.S. and Sensi weapons when me that this muld indeed now, and that it should be ansidered one of the more likely outcomes

This is choices; an underirable result and, presum-ably, our than the United States and the Soviet Union will try to avoid as both memory look for agreement it can

or all evolutes but neares soot for expected in can containly be recided if both nations wish to excided. The key this some of the period to must be the elimination of even the the more by possibility of a strategy first stake by either side. It does no good to offset a Societ expebility of the key with the of our own. The fear of a first terpolary one a courty of the control own into sear the massest for the polar to the relief of the court of the color for the polar to the the color of the co

belt sides, I prop sed in March a set of detailed guidelines for a strategic appreciation a proposal that had counterform weapons as its forms. Like the President's, this pro-posed has two phases

The first phase would be a selective breize on any additions to the counterforce inventory of either side and on any improvements to counterforce weapons run ently de-ployed. This might also be described as a "negotiators" ployed. This might sise or described as a degundant pause, designed to give breathing room to the negrotation by slowing the nomentum of uchning development at the cutting edge of the arms race.

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